






CAN COGNITIVE SCIENCE RESCUE ‘SPIRITUAL CARE’ FROM A METAPHYSICAL BACKWATER? AN ARGUMENT FOR MORE THEORY.

Abstract
'Spiritual care' has a valued but precarious place in contemporary UK health care. Although the term is widely used, it only attracts significant attention and resources related to care at the end of life; elsewhere, spiritual care is often under-resourced and perfunctory. The author argues that a major reason for this is that proponents of spiritual care have so far failed to speak a language comprehensible to reductionist, evidence-based practitioners and health managers. He proposes that current developments in the cognitive and evolutionary psychology of religion have the potential to provide such a language, and to refocus a subject that has been muddled by conceptual vagueness and the multiplication of assessment tools. As a result, attention to spirituality could be liberated from its current ghetto in palliative and long-term care and become more firmly embedded and integrated into everyday nursing practice. 
1.Introduction
A trickle of official reports and policy documents (DoH 2003, 2009; NeS 2008, 2009; Welsh Assembly 2010 ) witness to the fact that the ideas of ‘spirituality’ and ‘spiritual care’ now have an accepted place in the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS).  However, the attention these ideas attract is clearly very uneven: although spiritual assessment and care is a key element of palliative care, and is at least intended to be part of the initial assessment of a patient entering psychiatric care, such assessments are less consistently carried out in general nursing contexts and nurses are often reluctant to offer spiritual care (Carr 2010;  McSherry 2006, 2010; McSherry and Jamieson, 2011; Narayanasamy 2006; Ross 2006).  Across the health service, 'spiritual care' may be left to the chaplaincy team, if there is one: but recent cuts in chaplaincy services across the country leave such provision in a very precarious state. 
A significant contributor to the unease with which spirituality is addressed within the health service is the echo of its origins in a religious and classical-philosophical world which healthcare providers do not necessarily know or share (see Paley 2008b; Pesut et al 2008). It carries implications of a distinct 'spirit' in each human being which resists empirical or quantitative study, and therefore does not sit well in an evidence-based professional culture. Some proponents of 'spirituality' (e.g. White, 2006) would continue to advance this model – that there is something distinctly spiritual in every human being – but without a modern consensus it cannot form the basis for a general and costly nursing strategy. 
The most commonly adopted alternative is to empty ’spirituality’ of most of its determinate content, and excise it from its natural context in the discourse of religious communities (Paley 2008a). What is left is, as Mayers and Johnston say, a “highly subjective concept” (Mayers & Johnston 2008).  They conclude, “The lack of consensual definition has not only created confusion for healthcare practitioners, but it has also caused widespread debates regarding the nature of spirituality and its relationship to religion, disability and occupational performance”. The result is an alienated, if transferable, consumer product (Carrette & King 2004); a “metaphysical backwater” (Paley 2008a); even “metaphysical marshmallow that is non-specific, unlocated, thin, uncritical, dull and un-nutritious” (Pattison 2001). 
The grounding assumption of this paper is that, despite the difficulties of definition, the notion of ‘spirituality’ points (however vaguely) to something fundamental in human beings and therefore in person-centred care (see Pattison & Swinton 2010). As such, it should not be consigned to the margins of health care or left to volunteer chaplains. However, the absence of any theoretical base for spirituality leaves it relegated to a ghetto shared with ‘complementary’, ‘holistic’ or ‘patient centred’ care, below the radar of ‘serious’ clinicians.  If it is to be taken seriously, there is a need for a body of theory that might in principle generate predictions and hypotheses that could be tested in practice. If spiritual care is not to be at the mercy of individual service commissioners, it needs to have an account of why spirituality is important, what its main features are and how it may function in a healthcare context. Furthermore, this account needs to be a secular and materialist one: it should not require allegiance to any particular set of beliefs.

2.Towards a theoretical basis for spiritual care

The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential of one influential current model - often referred to under the umbrella term, Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) -  to generate a framework for talking about spirituality that is comprehensible both to reductionists and holists, and so perhaps to establish ‘spirituality’ more firmly and broadly within healthcare practice

As Schloss describes it (Schloss 2008), what has come to be termed the CSR represents the breakdown of a truce between science and religion that has deterred each from commenting on the other. The broad organising problem which CSR addresses could be framed as follows: “Why (despite a century of presumed secularisation) does religion persist in the western world, and why does it seem easier for human beings to be religious than to be secular?” This has of course gained relevance as the UK has become a pluralist society in which different faith communities have represented different challenges; and urgency as it has become clear that some religious communities are not only thriving but militant, threatening a comfortable secular consensus. 
There is now a discernible convergence on the question across several disciplines, a unified narrative that is satisfying and comprehensive in scope, even if it remains to be filled out with rigorous experimental data.  It has come to be termed the ‘standard model’ signifying its widespread acceptance, but also its tentative character.  The cluster of ideas that is emerging draws on insights from experimental psychology (e.g. Barrett 2004), evolutionary psychology (e.g. Sloan Wilson 2002, Tremlin 2006) and anthropologists of religion (e.g. Atran 2002,  Boyer 2001) and could be summed up thus: 
1.	That the mind can be understood as made up of separate ‘modules’ which perform discrete and identifiable functions (Barrett 2004, pp.3-6). 
2.	that this architecture and some specific processes of the human mind predispose humans to religious beliefs (Slone 2004) .  
3.	that certain ideas and mental images have qualities (for example, ‘minimal counterintuitiveness’) that make them more persistent and readily propagated than others (Boyer 2001; Murray & Goldberg 2009). Religious beliefs are not necessarily ‘answers’ in the sense of closing the question, but may be seen as seductive ways of re-posing it (Murray and Goldberg 2009, p. 184).
4.	That certain devices arise in a religious context (for example writing; ‘saturated’ religious ritual; capacity to discipline, identify out-groups, organize resources, promote social virtues) that provide stability and persistence to some religious collectivities (Atran 2002). This may provide an evolutionary advantage (Sloan Wilson 2005) or simply ensure the success of the religion at a cost to its members (Dawkins 2007, Bloom 2009) but it confers on religions their apparent objective solidity.
These conclusions on the face of it provide a satisfying answer to the questions posed above. The first important feature of this model is the priority that it gives to the individual and their cognitive bias. This may be reinforced by practices (individual and shared); but ‘beliefs’ in the sense of logical, consciously-held creedal formulae as generated and propagated by the officials of a particular religious tradition are rather low in the list of priorities.  One implication is that the widely-held view that inner ‘spirituality’ is distinct from external ‘religion’ and more widely encountered in a secular society (e.g. Heelas et al 2001) may have some real cognitive basis: ‘spirituality’ may have a place in the very architecture of the brain, long before ‘religion’ shapes and conditions it (see particularly Tremlin 2006, Ch6) . 
As a general theory of spirituality and religion, there are some real problems with this model. In practice, most people don’t come to religious beliefs all alone, and only then get them reinforced in public religious worship: the two are inseparable. Furthermore, the functions and effects of religion are rich, subtle and almost impossible to study in an experimental way: at this level, the model is little more than a basket of hunches and prejudices, and it is hard to imagine it having any real predictive or diagnostic function.
However, patients in a hospital or hospice context share some special circumstances, which give particular relevance to the areas in which the model is strongest. By definition, they are typically removed from their usual sources of religious practice and doctrinal reinforcement; they are at a stressful time in which they are likely to be looking for sources of support; and they are likely to be reappraising their beliefs in the light of unsettling events. In other words, such individuals are being thrown back on their individual intuitions. We might therefore find that their distinct religious backgrounds and practices become less salient than their internalised ‘spirituality’; and this, in turn, is likely to be more influenced by the cognitive mechanisms identified in the CSR model.
 At this restricted level, of isolated mental events in individuals at a defined time and place, the Cognitive Science of Religion has found some important ‘hard-wiring’: Bloom (2009, p.124) sums it up as follows:
Human beings possess early-emerging and universal cognitive biases, including hypersensitivity to agency, a natural propensity to see non-random design as caused by an intelligent designer, and body-soul dualism. These make it natural to believe in gods and spirits, in the divine creation of the universe, and in an afterlife.
In the restricted, isolated and stressful environment that is typically encountered by a patient in a hospital setting, such 'early-emerging and cognitive biases' are liable to have much more salience than would be the case for the population at large. If I am right in this speculation, then it should be possible to detect their influence on the sort of 'spirituality' that is adopted in such a context.
3.Discussion
For the purposes of this discussion, I am going to draw principally on the work of Barrett (e.g. Barrett 2004), as the origin for a number of the key findings from cognitive psychology. He identifies three key elements in the way the mind works:
1.	3.1 Unreflective reasoning. Cognitive psychologists such as Barrett (2004) distinguish our unreflective, day-to-day ‘quick and dirty’ reasoning from the careful, balanced, logical, resource-intensive reasoning that is exemplified in religious dogma or scientific thought. For example, although it is possible to maintain the meaninglessness of a series of events, in many respects this is counter-intuitive: even hardline materialists such as Richard Dawkins occasionally catch themselves ascribing intentionality to ‘Nature’ or ‘Evolution’. This distinction between our day-to-day reasoning and the settled formulae of religious belief gives rise to the ‘theological incorrectness’ of Slone (2004): our ‘gut-level’ beliefs are more likely to reflect the way our minds work than logically-held creedal statements. Equally, in a healthcare context there is evidence that, when under pressure, people use readily available ‘religious heuristics’ (Carone & Barone 2001) rather than logically-coherent, reasoned-out beliefs that are difficult to maintain.
This serves to frame the questions surrounding the notion of ‘spirituality’. Although theorists like myself and the advocates of creedal positions (whether religious, secular or atheist) would like to insist on the methodological purity and philosophical defensibility of whatever is delivered as ‘spiritual care’, those most closely involved in the day-to-day business of responding to patients’ spiritual needs are justifiably impatient with this sort of abstraction. Hospital Chaplains testify to the absolute need to improvise, while sitting very lightly to doctrinal orthodoxies; similarly, healthcare practitioners such as the dietician Gillian White (2006) conclude that the need is for more practical tools, and less interest in theoretical academic treatments. 
From the research outlined above, this joyous disregard for the labours of the theorists may have a strong theoretical justification. The complaint of practitioners is that the theory seems to be talking about something else entirely, and according to this research it often is: it studies settled beliefs arrived at and considered at leisure, not the quick-and-dirty, good-enough-for-now responses of people with other concerns. From this point of view, the scientistic critique of ‘spirituality’ offered by the likes of Paley (2008a, 20008b) is simply not scientific enough: it directs its criticisms at an imagined and theoretical object, not at the spirituality that is to be encountered in day-to-day clinical situations. It is this latter spirituality which must be addressed here.
2.	3.2 Hypersensitivity to Agency, sometimes reified in the positing of a ‘Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device’ (HADD) (Barrett 2004, pp.31-45) is fairly easy to demonstrate: faced with, for example, an unexpected noise, it predisposes us to ask “Who’s there?” rather than, “What’s that?”. It is ‘hypersensitive’ in the sense that it assumes the presence of an active agent more readily than is warranted by the frequency of such agents, but this can be assumed to have conferred an historic evolutionary advantage: repeatedly imagining beings that aren’t there carries with it little evolutionary cost, whereas failing to respond to a rustle which turns out to be a predator would have a great evolutionary cost!
A practical implication of this finding is that human beings may generally find it easier to believe in divine agents than not, and that a balanced mental state is more likely to include some transaction with divine beings than not. Faced with traumatic events, the natural human response is to seek to identify an ‘agent’ who may be responsible for initiating them or allowing them to happen. The old cliché that 'there are no atheists in foxholes' may be reflecting a subtle finding of cognitive psychology: that when under stress, the mind is pre-set to identify 'agents' even in the absence of any sensory evidence for them.
This creates for reductionists a set of problems redolent of those surrounding the theory of ‘positive illusions’ (Taylor & Brown, 1988) – that positive mental adjustment is not equivalent to adaptation to empirical data about the world and nothing else. There are good clinical reasons to take talk of gods and other ‘spiritual powers’ seriously, whether or not the healthcare professionals and their employers consider such talk to be mistaken (see Author 2010). Furthermore, there are good reductionist reasons why healthcare should include vague, ‘holistic’ aspirations such as support for a patient’s search for meaning.
3.	3.3 Theory of Mind. The data on this emerge primarily from studies on developmental psychology and appear to demonstrate that we naturally assume that an ‘agent’ has knowledge, perspective and purpose in a similar way to ourselves. It is linked to our early experience of change as generally taking place through conscious agency (e.g. Barrett & Richert 2003, Gergely & Csibra 2003, Keleman 1999) One implication is that when we intuit the presence of an ‘agent’ who is implicated in the way events are unfolding, we most naturally assume that this ‘agent’ has a purpose and method that is comprehensible to us.  Gods can be assumed to behave in a human sort of way, with desires for companionship, support and love. Thus, for example, Pargament (1997; see also Pargament et al 2000) identifies four basic ways of imagining ‘god’ that have an effect on a person’s ability to cope with a challenging life event: as Collaborative (as a friend or colleague); Deferring (as an authority-figure); Self-Directing (as indifferent or abandoning) and Pleading (as the one to whom supplications must be addressed). These are clearly based upon ways in which we imagine a relationship with another human, one who is more powerful and authoritative than ourselves.
Although research on the power of ‘religious coping’ has yielded mixed results it is clear that in some forms at least it has considerable clinical significance, and some of its counter-intuitive findings may be explicable in the context of the theory outlined here (Author 2012). This is what would be expected if a person’s sense of control over their situation depends upon their ability to discern ‘purpose’ (in the sense of comprehensible intentions and motives) behind it, and the way in which they ascribe that to an imagined divine figure. Distinct from the HADD, this process is complementary to it:
. . . if ToM can suggest an agent’s desires and aims relevant to the event, it affirms to HADD that the event was goal directed, increasing HADD’s confidence that agency has been discovered. Thus HADD’s work is not in isolation, and ToM’s flexibility and readiness to explain subtle signs of agency encourage HADD’s touchiness. (Barrett 2004, p.42)
For this reason the attempt by a patient facing a challenging event to tell a story of the origins, purpose and future meaning of their condition in terms of the purposeful action of divine beings or unnamed forces, viewed empirically, should not normally be seen as delusional or fanciful, but as a practical psychological strategy to assist them to address the situation and respond appropriately. From this perspective, any attempt to reason them out of their ideas is clearly pointless, counterproductive and potentially abusive. The less-precise and extended skills used in, say, the narrative versions of psychotherapy are more likely to be of use in this situation, for good empirical reasons. Although it is something of a cliché, there is truth in the claim that talk about meaning may hold a ‘truth’ not encompassed by a survey of the facts.

4. Conclusions for ‘secular’ healthcare and ‘religious’ spirituality
A cognitive-scientific model of spirituality is important not so much for the answers that it gives as for the way in which it focuses the questions.  Crucially, it provides a justification for talk of spiritual care in a secular healthcare system, even if talk about ‘religion’ must be treated with suspicion. The discovery of empirical mechanisms that encourage people to believe in a god or gods helps to explain the finding, widely reported in the literature, that in a healthcare setting ‘spirituality’ can have a consistent, positive effect. It moves the discussion of spirituality away from questions of its literal truth or falsehood towards questions of its value and the ways it can be fruitfully supported. 
This model further implies that those spiritual ideas that most successfully reflect the cognitive architecture of the human mind will be the ones that persist, and exert the most far-reaching influence, and in a companion paper (Author 2012) I seek to appraise this claim by a study of the research literature on religious coping. If this implication is successfully demonstrated, there will be good reasons to focus efforts on supporting these key themes.
When addressing these issues, it would be absurd and irrational for healthcare providers to ‘bracket out’ the insights, practices and rhetoric of particular religious communities, as a source of information about how best to direct and manage a patient’s own supportive belief structure. Where a pattern of shared religious behaviour has persisted, it is reasonable to assume that it has a developed ability to provide this sort of support and that the social psychology of religion should therefore form part of an overall concern for patient care.  However, the model gives good empirical evidence for our own common-sense assumption that formal religious beliefs and practices are secondary to the patient’s religious intuition, at least in this particular context.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to develop these insights into a set of themes that may be expected to recur in the context of a range of religious expression when they support successful ‘religious coping. There is no room to engage in a theological study in this paper, but it may be noted briefly that major religions typically hold that human beings are naturally 'spiritual' even if their true nature is obscured by sin, circumstances or  sickness. For example, the Abrahamic traditions claim that human beings are in the image of God; in Vedic-Indic religions there is the claim that we are all participants in or expressions of ultimate reality; even Enlightenment philosophy itself implies that the mind is ‘the mirror of nature’ (Rorty 1979, 1982).  There may even be scope for what has been termed a ‘metatheology’ (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999), in which the same cognitive themes are traceable through a range of religious traditions and expressions. 

Relevance to clinical practice
Although talk of spirituality has tended to conceptual vagueness and ungrounded assertions, there is an increasing body of evidence demonstrating that it reflects some aspects of fundamental human cognition. Thus, there are good clinical reasons why a materialist or reductionist healthcare practitioner should pay serious attention to a patient’s spiritual needs and seek to support their beliefs at a time of crisis. 
Specifically, there are three key areas where experimental findings have exposed some important early-emerging cognitive biases – around the ascription of agency in events, purpose to objects and occurrences, and the way in which ‘belief’ is achieved and validated – which may repay careful attention in ensuring the best outcomes for patients. In clinical practice, they suggest that talk of an accompanying 'presence' is not to be dismissed as meaningless imagination; that an attempt to discuss the possible 'purpose' behind a set of events may have important clinical outcomes; and that attempts to appraise a patient's spirituality should be directed towards their intuitions rather than their assent to formal creedal statements.; perhaps the insights provided by cognitive psychology can guide the development of more generalizable and intuitive versions.
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